you are being redirected

You will be redirected to the website of our parent company, Schönherr Rechtsanwälte GmbH: www.schoenherr.eu

16 February 2026
newsletter
austria

No-poach agreements: the antitrust spotlight on labour markets

The fight for talent has never been fiercer. With workforce shortages across Europe, companies are spending more than ever to recruit and retain top performers. Some businesses have tried to take a shortcut – agreeing with competitors not to poach each other's employees. Competition authorities have now made it crystal clear: this shortcut leads straight into antitrust enforcement territory.

The wake-up call: EUR 329m fine against Delivery Hero and Glovo

Last year, the European Commission (the "Commission") imposed a landmark fine of EUR 329m on food delivery giants Delivery Hero and Glovo for, among other things, agreeing not to hire each other's employees. This was a first: the Commission sanctioned the anticompetitive use of a minority shareholding in a competitor, with Delivery Hero's stake in Glovo facilitating the collusion.

The no-poach agreement covered virtually all employees, from logistics workers to managers – with only "riders" excluded because they were not classified as employees at the time. EVP Teresa Ribera put it bluntly: the Commission will be "attentive" to minority shareholdings and sensitive information flows between competitors.

What exactly is a no-poach agreement?

No-poach agreements are direct or indirect arrangements between companies competing for labour not to recruit each other's employees. They can take various forms:

(i)          Explicit agreements not to hire or solicit competitors' staff

(ii)         "Gentlemen's agreements" with no formal documentation

(iii)        Information exchanges about wages and employment benefits

(iv)       No-solicitation clauses in partnership contracts (though these may, in limited circumstances, escape prohibition)

These practices harm workers by reducing their bargaining power, limiting mobility and depressing wages. They also harm competition more broadly by restricting innovation, quality and, ultimately, consumer welfare.

The legal framework: why is this serious?

Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. No-poach agreements fall squarely within this prohibition. The Commission treats such agreements as restrictions "by object", meaning authorities do not need to prove actual harm. The Commission's 2023 horizontal guidelines explicitly cite "wage-fixing agreements" as examples of purchasing cartels, treating employees as suppliers of labour.

Not every restriction on hiring is automatically illegal. Certain ancillary restraints may be justified, particularly in the context of:

  • M&A transactions: The Commission's "Ancillary Restraints Notice" acknowledges that non-solicitation clauses comparable in scope to non-compete provisions may be acceptable to protect the acquired business.
  • Joint ventures and partnerships: Where genuinely necessary for the collaboration, time-limited and narrow non-solicitation clauses might pass muster – but the burden is on the parties to demonstrate necessity.

However, enforcers are quick to point out that less restrictive alternatives – such as individual non-compete clauses in employment contracts – may achieve the same legitimate objectives without raising competition concerns.

A global enforcement wave: recent no-poach cases

Competition authorities have prioritised this enforcement area. One particular case has even reached the European Court of Justice by way of a request for a preliminary ruling on a Covid-era no-poach strategy adopted by Portuguese football clubs. Needless to say, the ECJ's decision – expected in 2026 – is highly anticipated and has the potential to significantly shape this enforcement area.

Netherlands (February 2026)

  • Case / Industry: IT sector
  • Status / Fine: Probe ongoing
  • Key Facts: Investigation into suspected no-poach arrangements between tech companies

Romania (January 2026)

  • Case / Industry: Automotive sector
  • Status / Fine: EUR 32.1 million
  •  Key Facts: Eight firms agreed not to recruit each other's specialised workforce; First Romanian no-poach penalty

Italy (January 2026)

  • Case / Industry: Packaging machinery sector
  • Status / Fine: Dawn raids; probe ongoing
  • Key Facts: First labour market investigation targeting restrictions on validation specialists

United States (December 2025)

  • Case / Industry: Naval contractors
  • Status / Fine: Litigation ongoing
  • Key Facts: Alleged decades-long conspiracy to restrict hiring of naval engineers based on a "no-ink-to-paper" agreement

Turkey (October 2025)

  • Case / Industry: Pharmaceuticals
  • Status / Fine: EUR 5.83m
  • Key Facts: No-poach pacts plus exchange of wage and benefit information

Portugal (September 2025)

  • Case / Industry: Beverage industry
  • Status / Fine: Statement of Objections issued
  • Key Facts: Three major beverage companies agreed not to hire or make unsolicited offers to each other’s workers (2016–2023)

France (June 2025)

  •  Case / Industry: Engineering & IT services
  • Status / Fine: EUR 29.5m
  • Key Facts: "Gentlemen's agreements" not to solicit or hire each other’s employees

European Commission (June 2025)

  • Case / Industry: Food delivery
  •  Status / Fine: EUR 329m
  •  Key Facts: No-poach agreement covering all employees; First EC sanction of anticompetitive minority shareholding

Portugal (May 2025)

  • Case / Industry: Sports / Football
  • Status / Fine: ECJ decision pending
  • Key Facts: Covid-era agreement of Portuguese football clubs not to sign new contracts with each other’s players (2019–2020 season)

In Austria, too, additional no-poach cases are already in the pipeline, if public announcements are to be believed.

Practical recommendations: protecting your organisation

Given the enforcement climate, companies should take proactive steps:

  • Conduct a comprehensive review: Examine commercial agreements – including partnerships, outsourcing and supply contracts – for clauses restricting the hiring or solicitation of another company's employees.
  • Avoid exchanging sensitive wage information: Do not share information on actual or future employee wages or benefits with competitors; use only aggregated, historical data through independent third parties.
  • Train HR and management: Ensure that HR personnel also understand that discussions with competitors about hiring practices, wages or benefits are off-limits. Train staff that verbal or tacit "gentlemen's agreements" not to poach employees are unlawful and a key enforcement priority of competition authorities.
  • Scrutinise due diligence processes: When engaging in M&A transactions or other commercial discussions with competitors, establish protocols to prevent the exchange of labour-sensitive information such as individual wages, remuneration structures or hiring strategies.
  • Apply strict necessity tests: Any legitimate no-poach clause must be genuinely necessary, limited in scope (specific employees, short duration) and ancillary to a legitimate commercial purpose.

Outlook for 2026: more to come

The enforcement wave shows no sign of abating. Australia is consulting on legislation to ban no-poach agreements and wage-fixing deals entirely. The Slovak competition authority has published a study on detecting wage-fixing and no-poach arrangements using modern data tools.

The battle for talent is legitimate. Colluding with competitors to avoid that battle is not. Companies that fail to recognise this distinction risk not only regulatory fines, but also reputational damage and civil liability from affected employees.

authors: Johannes Frank, Maha Zöhrer

Johannes
Frank

Partner

austria vienna

co-authors