You will be redirected to the website of our parent company, Schönherr Rechtsanwälte GmbH: www.schoenherr.eu
The fight for talent has never been fiercer. With workforce shortages across Europe, companies are spending more than ever to recruit and retain top performers. Some businesses have tried to take a shortcut – agreeing with competitors not to poach each other's employees. Competition authorities have now made it crystal clear: this shortcut leads straight into antitrust enforcement territory.
Last year, the European Commission (the "Commission") imposed a landmark fine of EUR 329m on food delivery giants Delivery Hero and Glovo for, among other things, agreeing not to hire each other's employees. This was a first: the Commission sanctioned the anticompetitive use of a minority shareholding in a competitor, with Delivery Hero's stake in Glovo facilitating the collusion.
The no-poach agreement covered virtually all employees, from logistics workers to managers – with only "riders" excluded because they were not classified as employees at the time. EVP Teresa Ribera put it bluntly: the Commission will be "attentive" to minority shareholdings and sensitive information flows between competitors.
No-poach agreements are direct or indirect arrangements between companies competing for labour not to recruit each other's employees. They can take various forms:
(i) Explicit agreements not to hire or solicit competitors' staff
(ii) "Gentlemen's agreements" with no formal documentation
(iii) Information exchanges about wages and employment benefits
(iv) No-solicitation clauses in partnership contracts (though these may, in limited circumstances, escape prohibition)
These practices harm workers by reducing their bargaining power, limiting mobility and depressing wages. They also harm competition more broadly by restricting innovation, quality and, ultimately, consumer welfare.
Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. No-poach agreements fall squarely within this prohibition. The Commission treats such agreements as restrictions "by object", meaning authorities do not need to prove actual harm. The Commission's 2023 horizontal guidelines explicitly cite "wage-fixing agreements" as examples of purchasing cartels, treating employees as suppliers of labour.
Not every restriction on hiring is automatically illegal. Certain ancillary restraints may be justified, particularly in the context of:
However, enforcers are quick to point out that less restrictive alternatives – such as individual non-compete clauses in employment contracts – may achieve the same legitimate objectives without raising competition concerns.
Competition authorities have prioritised this enforcement area. One particular case has even reached the European Court of Justice by way of a request for a preliminary ruling on a Covid-era no-poach strategy adopted by Portuguese football clubs. Needless to say, the ECJ's decision – expected in 2026 – is highly anticipated and has the potential to significantly shape this enforcement area.
Netherlands (February 2026)
Romania (January 2026)
Italy (January 2026)
United States (December 2025)
Turkey (October 2025)
Portugal (September 2025)
France (June 2025)
European Commission (June 2025)
Portugal (May 2025)
In Austria, too, additional no-poach cases are already in the pipeline, if public announcements are to be believed.
Given the enforcement climate, companies should take proactive steps:
The enforcement wave shows no sign of abating. Australia is consulting on legislation to ban no-poach agreements and wage-fixing deals entirely. The Slovak competition authority has published a study on detecting wage-fixing and no-poach arrangements using modern data tools.
The battle for talent is legitimate. Colluding with competitors to avoid that battle is not. Companies that fail to recognise this distinction risk not only regulatory fines, but also reputational damage and civil liability from affected employees.
authors: Johannes Frank, Maha Zöhrer
Johannes
Frank
Partner
austria vienna