to the point: White Collar Crime Law in CEE 11/2026

(i)    On substantial aspects

Austrian Supreme Court, 3 September 2026, 15 Os 39/26p (fraudulent bankruptcy; forfeiture; financial benefit)

The case concerned a defendant convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy under Section 156(1) of the Criminal Code for concealing luxury watches and cufflinks worth approximately EUR 99,000 from his creditors. The public prosecutor challenged, among other things, the trial court's refusal to order forfeiture of these assets under Section 20(1) of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court rejected the nullity appeals.

The Court clarified that assets concealed to prevent creditors from accessing them may, in principle, constitute proceeds obtained through the offence and therefore be subject to forfeiture. However, forfeiture requires a financial benefit obtained as a direct consequence of the offence. In the present case, the trial court's findings did not establish such a benefit, in particular because they did not demonstrate any actual shortfall in the satisfaction of at least one creditor. 

Austrian Supreme Court, 15 September 2026, 12 Os 56/26s (fraudulent bankruptcy; association assets; forfeiture)

The case concerned two defendants convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy and embezzlement in connection with an individual business and several associations they had established. One of the convictions for fraudulent bankruptcy concerned the transfer of approximately EUR 31,400 from an association's bank account to the co-defendant.

The Supreme Court held that, given the association's separate legal personality and the fact that its funds had been generated in its own name and for its own account, the trial court's findings did not establish whether the transferred money formed part of the defendant's assets and was therefore accessible to his creditors. The Court consequently quashed the corresponding conviction and the co-defendant's conviction for participating in that act, together with the related legal classifications, forfeiture order and sentences, and remanded the case to that extent. It otherwise rejected the nullity appeals, confirming that economically disadvantageous agreements allowing third parties to use a debtor's assets without adequate consideration may constitute fraudulent bankruptcy.

Austrian Supreme Court, 15 September 2026, 12 Os 60/26d (aggravated fraud; forfeiture; suspended sentence)

The case concerned a defendant convicted of aggravated fraud for inducing customers to make advance payments totalling EUR 363,990 to a company by falsely representing its solvency and ability to perform contractual obligations. The defendant challenged, among other things, the forfeiture order and the refusal to grant a suspended sentence.

The Supreme Court held that funds fraudulently received by a single-member limited liability company may be regarded as obtained by its sole shareholder and de facto managing director under Section 20(1) of the Criminal Code where the shareholder exercised factual and economic control over them and could exploit them economically. The Court therefore rejected the nullity challenge concerning forfeiture. However, it held that relying on the defendant's lack of admission of guilt as a contributing factor in refusing a suspended sentence constituted an unacceptable violation of the law. The Court consequently quashed only the sentence and remanded the case for a new hearing and decision on sentencing.
Austrian Supreme Court, 22 September 2026, 14 Os 67/26y (fraudulent bankruptcy; managing director's withdrawals; concurrent offences)

The case concerned a managing director convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy, grossly negligent impairment of creditors' interests and misrepresentation of material information in financial statements. He had transferred approximately EUR 108,000 from the company to himself as purported loans without intending to repay them and had failed to comply with accounting requirements. The Supreme Court rejected his nullity appeal.
The Court clarified that fraudulent bankruptcy under Section 156 of the Criminal Code does not require insolvency, over-indebtedness or even an economic crisis affecting the debtor. It further held that the apparent concurrence of fraudulent bankruptcy and grossly negligent impairment of creditors' interests under Section 159 applies only where the offences concern the same conduct and the same object. In the present case, the convictions concerned separate acts and could therefore stand alongside each other.
(ii)    On procedural aspects

Higher Regional Court of Linz, 8 September 2026, 8 Bs 110/26x (access to files; commencement of investigations; judicial protection)

The case concerned a complainant who sought access to documents held by the public prosecutor's office relating to allegations of abuse of office against public officials. The public prosecutor had declined to initiate an investigation under Section 35c of the Public Prosecutors Act (StAG), and the complainant challenged the subsequent refusal of access by lodging an objection under Section 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Higher Regional Court dismissed the appeal against the rejection of the objection. It held that merely receiving a criminal complaint does not constitute the commencement of an investigation. An objection under Section 106 is available only for alleged violations of rights occurring during an investigation and cannot be used to compel its commencement. The Court further clarified that judicial protection under Article 6 ECHR may be available before an investigation has formally begun, but only to the person suspected or accused, not to the complainant.

Higher Regional Court of Graz, 23 September 2026, 10 Bs 271/26t (forfeiture; seized assets; victim restitution)

The case concerned EUR 10,290 seized from a defendant convicted of aggravated burglary, against whom the trial court had ordered value-based forfeiture of EUR 153,750 under Section 20(3) of the Criminal Code. The trial court subsequently ordered the seized funds to be transferred to the State, while the victim sought their return. The Higher Regional Court set aside that order.

The Court clarified that only asset-specific forfeiture under Section 20(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code transfers ownership of the forfeited assets to the State upon the forfeiture order becoming final. By contrast, value-based forfeiture under Section 20(3) merely establishes a monetary claim against the convicted person and does not transfer ownership of specific assets. The seized funds could therefore not be transferred to the State on that basis. However, their immediate return to the victim was also precluded, as the earlier restitution order had not become final. A new decision under Section 367(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would require establishing that the funds belonged to the victim and were connected to the offence.

Austrian Supreme Court, 22 September 2026, 14 Os 87/26i (bribery; limitation periods; investigative measures)

The case concerned a public official employed by Austria's domestic intelligence service who had been convicted of accepting cash payments for unlawful company register searches and the preparation of organisational charts. At issue was whether earlier investigative measures had suspended the limitation periods for these offences. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
The Court held that investigative measures suspend the limitation period under Section 58(3)(2) of the Criminal Code only if they concern the suspicion of the same specific historical conduct, irrespective of its legal classification. The trial court had failed to establish this connection, as the cited investigative records concerned allegations involving the disclosure of confidential information in exchange for payment rather than the conduct underlying the convictions. The findings were therefore insufficient to determine whether the offences were time-barred.

(i)    On substantial aspects:

Mureș Tribunal, 9 October 2026, Criminal Judgment No. 186/2026 (tax evasion)

In this case, the defendant allegedly committed tax evasion, in 129 counts, by creating fictitious invoices in the company's accounting records, between January 2013 and December 2016, with the purpose of artificially increasing deductible expenses and deducting VAT. The total value of the transactions amounted to a taxable base of RON 4,112,083 (EUR 771,000) and RON 977,367 in VAT (EUR 183,200).

The court concluded that the defendant had acted intentionally, with the specific purpose of reducing the company's tax obligations. The court also held that the transactions formed a single continued offence, rejecting the argument that the time gap between certain invoices would justify dividing the conduct into two separate offences. The defendant was sentenced to pay a criminal fine of RON 48,000 (EUR 8,974). The court also imposed a complementary penalty prohibiting the defendant, for a period of two years, from standing for election to public authorities or from holding public office involving the exercise of state authority.

Bucharest Court of Appeal, 25 September 2026, Criminal Judgment No. 174/2026 (embezzlement)

In this case, the judgment concerns three defendants, two of which were charged with embezzlement resulting in particularly serious consequences, while the third was charged with aiding and abetting embezzlement. Between 2019 and 2023, the first defendant (the former administrator and majority shareholder of a commercial company) and the second defendant (his successor as administrator) entered into legal assistance agreements with the third defendant, their lawyer, for services the company did not actually need, with fees later increased to exorbitant amounts through addenda, after which the agreements were enforced against the company. The contracts signed by the first administrator totalled EUR 1.31m, while those signed by the second administrator amounted to EUR 1.63m. The first defendant also failed to challenge the enforcement proceedings and, after his bank accounts were garnished, transferred RON 15,000 (EUR 2,800) to his daughter.

The Court of Appeal acquitted the lawyer, finding that the legal services had in fact been provided, the contracts were valid, and the fees had not been subsequently altered, so that any conflict of interest could entail at most disciplinary, rather than criminal, liability. The first and second administrator were convicted of embezzlement and evading seizure, and of continued embezzlement, respectively. 

(iii)    On procedural aspects:

Constitutional Court, 6 October 2026, Decision No. 968/2026 (seizure of objects and documents; reasonable suspicion)

The case concerned the constitutionality of Article 159(13) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which governs seizures during searches. As a rule, only objects and documents linked to the offence under investigation may be seized. An exception requires the seizure of items suspected of being linked to an offence subject to mandatory ex officio prosecution. The question was whether mere suspicion met constitutional standards of legal precision and protection of the home and private life.

The Constitutional Court held that seizure under this exception requires reasonable suspicion. By failing to expressly require that standard, the provision gave investigators excessive discretion and allowed inconsistent decisions in similar cases. The Court therefore found Article 159(13) unconstitutional to that extent, in breach of Article 1(5) of the Constitution on the quality and predictability of the law and Article 27 on the inviolability of the home.

Case of Anar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, 6 October 2026, Applications numbers 12043/19 and 50484/20 (seizure of property; absence of consent)

The case concerned whether the seizure and examination of an applicant's phones, laptop and documents from his home, carried out without judicial authorisation and without clarifying his procedural status, were compatible with his right to respect for private life and correspondence under Article 8 of the Convention. Although the applicant had signed a declaration of voluntary surrender, he claimed that the declaration had been dictated to him during questioning, after the phones had already been seized, raising the question of what standard of consent was required to justify such an interference in the absence of a warrant.

The European Court of Human Rights found that consent to such measures must be informed, free from constraint and accompanied by appropriate safeguards, and that mere acceptance of handing over items does not amount to consent to entry into the home or to the examination of stored data. It further held that the unclear and contradictory invocation of consent and urgency, the absence of any reasoning for departing from the requirement of judicial authorisation, the examination of the data without lawful authorisation, and the absence of an effective subsequent judicial review deprived the applicant of the minimum protection against arbitrariness. It concluded that the interference was not "in accordance with the law" in violation of Article 8 of the Convention.

22 October 2026, Cases C-660/24 and C-681/24, Commission v. Hungary and Commission v. Czech Republic (access to a lawyer; questioning of suspects; defence rights)

The cases concerned infringement proceedings against Hungary and the Czech Republic over national legislation permitting suspects to be questioned without their lawyers if counsel failed to attend within a prescribed period. In Hungary, questioning could proceed two hours after the lawyer had been notified of the suspect's detention, while Czech law provided for a period of 48 hours after detention and also permitted questioning where the lawyer could not be reached. The ECJ held that both Member States had infringed Directive 2013/48/EU.

The Court clarified that the right of access to a lawyer includes, in principle, the lawyer's physical presence and effective participation during questioning. Temporary derogations are permissible only on the exhaustive grounds laid down in the Directive and cannot be justified merely by the expiry of a statutory waiting period. The Court further held that Hungary had failed to transpose the Directive's safeguards governing the waiver of this right, including the requirements that such a waiver be informed, voluntary and unequivocal.